Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 52

Issue 1

Article 24

2020

Talking Foreign Policy: April 24, 2019 Broadcast: "Untangling the
Yemen Crisis"
TFP Panel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
TFP Panel, Talking Foreign Policy: April 24, 2019 Broadcast: "Untangling the Yemen Crisis", 52 Case W.
Res. J. Int'l L. 513 (2020)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol52/iss1/24

This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)

Talking Foreign Policy - April
24, 2019 broadcast: “Untangling
the Yemen Crisis”
1

Michael Scharf: According to a recent UN report, the war in
Yemen has become the worst humanitarian crisis on the planet.
Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy. I’m your host Michael Scharf, 2
Dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. In this
broadcast our expert panelists will be discussing the history of the
Yemen conflict, the challenges to resolving it, and the prospects for
achieving accountability for the war crimes that have been committed
there. Joining us for the second segment today, as soon as his cab
arrives, is Dr. Paul Williams, 3 the President of the Public International
Law and Policy Group, a Nobel Peace Prize nominated NGO that has
provided legal counsel to a dozen peace negotiations over the past 22
years, including in Yemen. We’re also joined and they’re already here
by Professor Milena Sterio, 4 the Associate Dean of Cleveland State’s
Marshall College of Law and a renowned international law expert.
Milena just returned from a meeting in Jordan with Yemeni prosecutors
and judges, to discuss accountability options for Yemen. It’s good to
have you back on the show.
Milena Sterio: It is great to be here.

1.

Transcript edited and footnotes added by Cox Center Fellow Andrea
Shaia.

2.

Michael Scharf is the Dean of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. He has also written and published extensively in the area of
international law. Michael Scharf, CASE W. RES. UNIV. SCHOOL OF L.,
https://case.edu/law/our-school/faculty-directory/michael-p-scharf
[https://perma.cc/V62W-MYM9].

3.

Paul Williams is a professor at American University Washington College
of Law. He is also the president of the Public International Law & Policy
Group, a Nobel-Peace-Prize-nominated NGO that has provided legal
counsel in a dozen peace negotiations over the past twenty-two years.
UNIV.
WASH.
COLLEGE
OF
L.,
Paul
Williams,
AM .
https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/pwilliams/bi
o/ [https://perma.cc/GZE7-5UKK].

4.

Milena Sterio is the Associate Dean of Cleveland Marshall College of Law
and a renowned international law expert. Milena Sterio, CLEV. MARSHALL
COLLEGE
OF
L.,
https://www.law.csuohio.edu/newsevents/featuredfaculty/milena-sterio
[https://perma.cc/565E-5J8M].
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Michael Scharf: We also have Professor Colonel Jim Johnson,5
the director of the Case Western Reserve University war crimes
research office and a former chief of prosecutions of the special court
for Sierra Leone. Jim recently launched the Yemen Accountability
Project at Case Western which aims to map the war crimes committed
during the conflict. Welcome back to the show Jim.
Jim Johnson: Thank you Michael. It’s great to be here.
Michael Scharf: And finally, we have a new guest. Dr. Laura
Graham, 6 a former professor of genocide studies at Tufts University,
who is currently a student at Case Western Reserve University School
of Law. Laura is the director of the Yemen Accountability Project
which has a staff of 70 student volunteers. Welcome to Talking Foreign
Policy Laura.
Laura Graham: Thanks for having me.
Michael Scharf: Let’s start with a refresher on the history of the
Yemen situation. It’s a complex war and you practically need to have
a scorecard to keep track of the warring parties. Milena Sterio you were
meeting with representatives of Yemen just a month ago. Can you tell
us about the different sides and the conflicts and what they are fighting
for?
Milena Sterio: Sure, so just to explain where this all started
Yemen the current state of Yemen wasn’t created until 1990 when the
northern part of Yemen, which until that point had been called the
Yemeni Arab Republic, and had been backed by the US and Saudi
Arabia, was United with the southern part of Yemen, which at the time
was called the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and it had been
backed by the USSR. 7 From 1990 up until the Arab Spring in 2011,
5.

Jim Johnson is a former prosecutor for the court of Sierra Leone, and now
is an adjunct professor at Case Western Reserve School of Law where he
teaches classes on international law and is the faculty advisor for the
Yemen Accountability Project. Jim Johnson, CASE W. RES. UNIV. SCHOOL
OF L., https://case.edu/law/our-school/faculty-directory/adjunct-faculty
[https://perma.cc/47VD-7MWR].

6.

Laura Graham has a Ph.D. and use to be a professor at several universities
teaching class relating to justice studies and conflict studies. Laura is
currently a first-year law student at Case Western University School of
Law and is the director of the Yemen Accountability Project. Laura
Graham, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/laura-graham-ph-d9562085/ (last visited Feb 17, 2020).

7.

Zachary Laub, Yemen in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 19,
2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis
[https://perma.cc/CK7X-YR7U].
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Yemen was ruled by a dictator called Saleh, and there were widespread
allegations of corruption human rights abuses; things were relatively
stable but the regime was certainly corrupt and doing lots of bad
things. 8 In the wake of the Arab Spring, there was also a revolution in
Yemen which rousted Saleh from power, but instead of Saleh the new
person who came to power was Al Hadi who used to be Saleh’s vice
president. 9 He was perceived as a much weaker leader and that resulted
in a rebellion by the Houthi rebels, who are supported by Iran. 10 So
right now on the one side there the Houthi rebels supported by Iran
and on the other side there’s the president Al Hadi who’s supported by
Saudi Arabia and really backed by most of the Western world including
the United States, the UK, and France. 11 And to top it all off there’s
also al Qaeda and ISIS which are also present mostly in the southern
part of Yemen. 12
Michael Scharf: So, Jim Johnson as someone, who has personally
prosecuted war crimes and crimes against humanity before
international tribunals, who are the victims of the Yemen conflict?
Jim Johnson: Well as in most of these conflicts Michael the
victims are civilians. They’re the young, the old. They are those who
are not taking any active part in the hostility. In the worst cases you
have these civilians being targeted intentionally, and in many many
other cases, you have no effort by the warring factions to discriminate
between civilians and what might be legitimate military targets.13
Civilians may be attacked because of their religious affiliation, of what
ethnic group they belong to, of who their purser who they are perceived
to support in this conflict aren’t just on what side of these of the conflict
they’re on. 14 So it’s civilians, it’s the innocents that are the victims of
this conflict.
Michael Scharf: So, as I said at the top of the broadcast the UN
is characterizing Yemen as the worst humanitarian crisis on the planet

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.

See generally id.

13.

Yemen Events of 2017, HUM, RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2018/country-chapters/yemen [https://perma.cc/KVE4-89RJ].

14.

See id.
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today. 15 Milena how does the Yemen carnage that Jim was describing
compared with places like Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, and Burma?
Milena Sterio: Sure, so you know it is very hard to place a value
on different crises and say that Libya is a two and Yemen is a three
and Syria is a four. But I do believe that the Yemen crisis right now is
one of the worst, and I think the world really wasn’t paying much
attention to it until very recently. Maybe because we were so focused
on Syria where we definitely experienced the very serious crises 16 but
the one in Yemen right now is just as serious. Afghanistan you know
was a serious perhaps in the 90s. In post 9/11, things seem to be perhaps
a little bit better there now. Libya though is unraveling, and we might
unfortunately we might see a large humanitarian crisis in full unfolding
there. In Burma, we know that the Rohingya population was persecuted
and we saw a serious crisis there. 17 But I would say that Yemen
definitely is in a very difficult situation right now.
Michael Scharf: Well last week there were terrorist incidents in
Sri Lanka, three hundred people died, and the world took note. 18 There
have been sixty thousand casualties in the Yemen crisis. 19 Laura
Graham why do you think most Americans aren’t paying attention to
the Yemen situation.
Laura Graham: Well I think most Americans don’t really see how
this conflict affects their lives and until last fall when the New York
Times started to publish photos of what mass starvation looks like in
Yemen, people really didn’t have much of an interest in it and in part
15.

Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen Remains the Worst in the World, Warns
NEWS
(Feb.
14,
2019),
UN,
U.N.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811
[https://perma.cc/3RXZ-Z4DN] [hereinafter U.N. Warning on Yemen].

16.

Grave Concern Over Escalating Humanitarian Crisis, Casualties,
Displacement Across Northwest Syria: UN, U.N. NEWS (May 2, 2019),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1037771
[https://perma.cc/5FAJ-BPJS].

17.

Rebecca Ratcliffe, Who are the Rohingya and What is Happening in
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
5,
Myanmar?,
THE
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2017/sep/06/who-are-the-rohingya-and-what-is-happeningin-myanmar [https://perma.cc/2HHM-FXBJ].

18.

Grief, Anger and Recriminations in Sri Lanka as ISIS Claims It Staged
TIMES
(Apr.
23,
2019),
Bomb
Attacks,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/world/asia/sri-lankabombing.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/UKX2-BZXG].

19.

Ceasefire Ends Intense Fighting in Yemen Port City, CBC (Dec. 17,
2018),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-ceasefire-1.4950195
[https://perma.cc/FD86-ZG75].
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that goes back to Milena’s point that what was happening in Syria at
the time and fighting against ISIS it has just been more important to
the American public.
Michael Scharf: Well so Milena, in addition to the number of
victims and the photos of mass starvation why should we as Americans
care about Yemen? Are their strategically important interests at stake
here?
Milena Sterio: Sure, so because this conflict has truly emerged as
a proxy war between Houthi rebels backed by Iran and then the official
government backed by Saudi Arabia, I would say that there’s definitely
a big threat in Yemen to Saudi Arabia and countries that back Saudi
Arabia including the United States. To the extent that we care about
containing the influence of Iran in the region, we really should care
about what’s going on in Yemen because the Houthi rebels had
overtaken a very large part of the Yemeni Yemeni territory. 20 There’s
also a geographic strategic importance here because the Houthi rebels
for a while had been controlling the Red Sea port of Hodeidah which is
a very important strategic point. 21 And then the other very important
reason to pay attention is that we have seen a resurgence of al Qaeda
and ISIS forces in Yemen. 22 We know that ISIS for now has been
defeated in Syria, but most experts agree that Isis will re-emerge
whether it’s in Syria, Iraq, or in Yemen. 23 And so I think we definitely
should be paying attention.
Michael Scharf: Are there also a lot of refugee flows that we
should be concerned about?
Milena Sterio: Definitely. So because of the situation in Syria
there have been very large refugee flows coming out of Syria and now
20.

Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Hand Over Control of Port City of Hodeidah,
CBC (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-houthiceasefire-exchange-1.4961426
[https://perma.cc/BY99-LHVT]
[hereinafter Rebels Hand over Control of Hodeidah].

21.

Id.

22.

Sudarsan Raghavan, With the ISIS Caliphate Defeated in Syria, an
Islamist Militant Rivalry Takes Root in Yemen, WASH. POST (Apr. 14,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/with-theonce-declared-caliphate-of-isis-defeated-in-syria-an-islamist-militantrivalry-takes-root-in-yemen/2019/04/13/d54148a6-34d3-4a67-a40a9dc4f783338e_story.html?utm_term=.39d9c37b9a73
[https://perma.cc/P8F2-TM8F].

23.

The
Current
State
of
ISIS,
NPR
(July
21,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/21/631089434/the-current-state-of-isis
[https://perma.cc/92PK-NSQC].
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with the situation in Yemen there have been refugee flows coming out
of Yemen. 24 And all of that is a big threat to the overall stability in the
Middle East. 25
Michael Scharf: You know to put that in perspective I was
reading recently that you can connect the dots between the refugee
flows out of Syria and Brexit and so when you talk about the threat to
stability in the Middle East it could be also to Europe. 26
Milena Sterio: Absolutely
Michael Scharf: Right. So, you were talking about sort of a
greater struggle, a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Tell us
more about what’s going on in the Middle East with respect to those
two countries.
Milena Sterio: Sure so the Houthi rebels in Yemen are backed by
Iran. 27 Iran officially denies it, but most experts agree that Iran is
backing the Houthi rebel movement and most of those individuals are
Shia Muslims and in Iran is a predominantly Shia country. 28 The official
government is backed by Saudi Arabia and its allies including the
United States, United Kingdom, and France 29 and most of the allies.
Michael Scharf: And there’s a Sunni government so they have an
affinity with Saudi Arabia
Milena Sterio: Exactly so this is Sunni majority government has
an affinity with Saudi Arabia and because of the Saudi Arabian
involvement in the conflict, most of the weapons and other training
logistical support has been provided by countries like the United States,
24.

Refugee Crisis Poses Long-term Threats to the Middle East, ARAB
WEEKLY (Nov. 25, 2018), https://thearabweekly.com/refugee-crisis-poseslong-term-threats-middle-east [https://perma.cc/Y425-WQKN].

25.

Id.

26.

See Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Brexit Is Very Bad News for Refugees,
THINKPROGRESS (June 24, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/brexit-isvery-bad-news-for-refugees-d43c8800f9b4/
[https://perma.cc/8XLS5M27].

27.

Bruce Riedel, Who are the Houthis, and Why are We at War with Them?,
BROOKINGS
(Dec.
18,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-thehouthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/
[https://perma.cc/VKP8VR9Y].

28.

Id.

29.

Laub, supra note 7.
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the UK, and France. 30 And so it is going to be very difficult to stabilize
the conflict without trying to contain Saudi Arabia’s involvement, but
again Saudi Arabia’s involvement is linked to the involvement of
countries like the U.S. the UK and France.
Michael Scharf: You know in thinking about this proxy war I
think there are some good reasons to be worried about Iran. They’ve
been meddling in Syria. 31 They’ve been meddling elsewhere. 32 They’ve
been supporting some terrorist groups. 33 There have been arguments
about why the Iranian nuclear deal should be discontinued. 34 Do you
feel that it is a good policy for the United States to support the other
side whenever Iran is involved?
Milena Sterio: No I don’t think it’s a good policy because the
problem with this, although we should be worried about what Iran is
doing and containing Iran, I also think that we shouldn’t be giving carte
blanche to Saudi Arabia because especially in this conflict, the Saudis
have been accused of launching indiscriminate attacks and committing
atrocities against civilians in Yemen. 35 And so I think that’s a very
dangerous policy to say we’re going to support Saudi Arabia, provide
them with weapons, do anything we can to support them without really
trying to contain what they are doing.
Michael Scharf: And Laura your team has been documenting the
kinds of victimization that is occurring because of these bombings.
What can you tell us about it? How can you quantify that for us?
Laura Graham: That’s right well we’ve been looking at the armed
conflict location and event data projects and trying to corroborate that
and we found that there have been over 67,000 civilian casualties since
30.

Id.

31.

Martin Reardon, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the ‘Great Game’ in Yemen, AL
JAZEERA
(Mar.
26,
2015),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-irangreat-game-ye-201492984846324440.html
[https://perma.cc/M3HQXXVM].

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Jonathan Tirone, Iran’s Nuclear Program, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/irans-uranium-enrichment
[https://perma.cc/5E8Z-ZLVW].

35.

Thanassis Cambanis & Michael Wahid Hanna, The War in Yemen Is a
Tragedy—and America Can End Its Complicity, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct.
24, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/war-yemen-tragedyamerica-can-end-complicity/?agreed=1 [https://perma.cc/XY3T-B5NB].
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2016. 36 And there are an additional 10 million people who are at risk of
mass starvation. 37 And so this is all a combination of attacks against
civilians that are being committed by the Saudi-led coalition as well as
the Houthi rebels with about two-thirds of those casualties being
attributed to the Saudi-led coalition 38 and the other third attributed to
Houthi rebels.
Michael Scharf: And let me ask Colonel Jim Johnson a question
about that. So the U.S. has reportedly provided 4.5 billion dollars in
arms to Saudi Arabia within the last year. 39 With your experience, 30
years in the military and as an international prosecutor, do you believe
that those arms that are coming from the United States are being used
to facilitate the war crimes in Yemen?
Jim Johnson: Yes. There is ample evidence to show that U.S.
arms are indeed being used by the Saudi-led coalition in their actions
in Yemen and of course many of these actions are causing civilian
casualties and potentially war crimes. 40 The U.S. is if not the largest
supplier certainly one of the largest suppliers of arms and ammunition
to the Saudi Arabians and to other members of the Saudi-led coalition.41
In addition, we of course have U.S. providing spare parts for the
weapons systems, for the airplanes that are U.S. made airplanes being
36.

More than 70,000 Killed in Yemen’s Civil War: ACLED, AL JAZEERA
(Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/yemen-wardeath-toll-reaches-70000-report-190419120508897.html
[https://perma.cc/MP37-EM4V].

37.

14 Million People in Yemen Face ‘Imminent and Great Big Famine,’
NBC (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/14-millionpeople-yemen-face-imminent-great-big-famine-n923756
[https://perma.cc/L664-B9P5].

38.

Robbie Gramer & Lara Seligman, Trump’s Yemen Veto Could Still Cost
POLICY
(Apr.
18,
2019),
Saudis,
FOREIGN
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/18/trumps-yemen-veto-could-stillcost-saudis-middle-east-congress-lawmakers-after-veto-sanctions-saudiofficials-arms-sales-humanitarian-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/9PC5CUMD].

39.

WILLIAM HARTUNG & CHRISTINA ARABIA, CTR. INT’L POL’Y, TRENDS IN
MAJOR U.S. ARMS SALES IN 2018: THE TRUMP RECORD – RHETORIC
VERSUS REALITY 2 (2019).

40.

Declan Walsh & Eric Schmitt, Arms Sales to Saudis Leave American
Fingerprints on Yemen’s Carnage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemen-ussaudi-civilian-war.html [https://perma.cc/4Q79-VU5D].

41.

Angela Dewan, These are the Countries still Selling Arms to Saudi Arabia,
CNN
(Nov.
23,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudiarabia-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/VG3D-SW59].
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used in those airstrikes, maintenance, technical assistance, as well as
intelligence support, and refueling. 42
This is of course so much that you’ve seen the action by the U.S.
Congress just lately and we’ll be talking about more concerns on how
U.S. weapons are being used.
Michael Scharf: Well, I do want to ask you this, if the U.S. is
facilitating Saudi war crimes as a criminal prosecutor does that
implicate the United States in those crimes?
Jim Johnson: That raises many, many red flags as far as to the
extent the U.S. may be aiding and abetting in the commission of war
crimes. 43
Michael Scharf: All right. Well with that sober thought, it is time
for a short station break. When we return, we’ll be talking about the
prospects for peace in Yemen. We’ll be back in just a moment.

BREAK
Michael Scharf: Welcome back to talking foreign policy, brought
to you by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3
ideastream. I’m Michael Scharf, Dean of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, and your host. We’re talking today about
the bloody conflict in Yemen which most Americans don’t know much
about. Before the break we were discussing the causes of the conflict.
Now let’s turn to the prospects for peace. Milena Sterio, you just
returned from meetings in Jordan with individuals involved in the
Yemen peace process. What is the current status of peace negotiations
in that country?
Milena Sterio: So, in December of 2018, the representatives from
the official government as well as the Houthi rebels actually met for
peace talks in Sweden and these peace talks were sponsored by the
United Nations. 44 And both sides agreed to a number of things. So they
agreed for example, that Houthi rebels were supposed to withdraw from
the Hodeidah seaport which had been under siege. 45 And that was
hugely important because humanitarian shipments, food, medicine all
42.

Cambanis & Hannah, supra note 35.

43.

Id.

44.

Declan Walsh, Yemen Peace Talks Begin with Agreement to Free 5,000
TIMES
(Dec.
6,
2018),
Prisoners,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/world/middleeast/yemen-peacetalks.html [https://perma.cc/APP2-7R6H].

45.

Rebels Hand over Control of Hodeidah, supra note 20.
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of that had been arriving through the Hodeidah seaport and that was
under siege. 46 So they’re supposed to withdraw and the UN is supposed
to supervise and make sure that their humanitarian corridors there.47
They also agreed on the creation of additional humanitarian corridors
in other parts of the country, and they also agreed to a large prisoner
swap. 48 The problem today is that most people think that these the
things that the parties agree to are not being properly implemented.49
That the parties are actually not sticking to their promises.
Michael Scharf: Alright and as promised Paul Williams has just
arrived. Paul you were involved in peace talks in Yemen between 2011
and 2014 as the legal adviser to U.N. envoy Jamal Benomar. Tell us
about that experience.
Paul Williams: The experience working as a legal adviser on the
peace process was quite frankly astounding. It was almost as if the
peace process was a Rubik’s Cube and just as you lined up one of the
colors on one of the sides and had some progress on the Constitution
or a ceasefire, you’d look at the rest of the process. And it was that
total mess with all the different colors you trying to get all of the
different factions, the different parties, the different issues, the different
interests aligned is hugely complicated.
Michael Scharf: So, Milena was telling us about the current
status. What do you think were the lessons learned from the 2011, 2014
peace talks and how do you think those should inform the current peace
process?
Paul Williams: The that we learned from the earlier peace process
was that you need to heavily incentivize the parties towards peace and
not towards war. There was never a full commitment by the members
of the Security Council or by the sponsors of the various factions to
commit fully to peace. They always kept conflict in their back pocket,
and in fact, on the way to the Parliament, the special representative,
the president who was carrying the Constitution to the Parliament for

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Walsh, supra note 44.

49.

London Meeting to Discuss ‘Next Steps’ for Yemen Peace Process, AL
JAZEERA
(Apr.
26,
2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/london-meeting-discuss-stepsyemen-peace-process-190426093936744.html
[https://perma.cc/LTA2C97F].
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approval was kidnapped. 50 The Houthis grabbed the Constitution and
tore it up because they opted to go with their backers the Iranians on
the use of force. And it had never been made explicitly clear that the
use of force is off the table. We see the consequences of that. This next
round has to be full and commitment to peace with the parties backing
down from this notion of supporting the armed struggle.
Michael Scharf: Well, let me ask you a follow-up. Some experts
believe that the best chance of winding down the war is to increase U.S.
pressure on Saudi Arabia to end its aerial bombing campaign and also
to more actively pursue a peace deal with the Houthi rebels. 51 What’s
your take on that?
Paul Williams: That’s correct.
Michael Scharf: And how would that be accomplished?
Paul Williams: This conflict cannot be won militarily. Just the
nature of the terrain, the nature of the fractionalization of the
population, and the inability of the Saudis, the UAE to commit any
sense of serious ground support, makes this an unwinnable conflict. And
you’ll simply have 24 million Yemeni victims as the parties’ sort of, you
know, try to work it out on the battlefield. That is not going to work
you need to retrench from that aggressive perspective and throw the
lot completely in for peace talks.
Michael Scharf: So, we were talking earlier about the moral
problems and even the legal problems of the U.S. supplying so many
arms to Saudi Arabia which are being used against victims in Yemen.
The houses of Congress in the United States recently voted to end
American military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen. And the
vote was 257 to 17652 in the House of Representatives so that was

50.

Nick Paton Walsh et al., Shiite Rebels Abduct Yemeni President’s Chief
of
Staff,
CNN
(Jan.
17,
2015),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/01/17/world/yemen-abduction/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KHT3-83FN].

51.

See Mohamad Bazzi, The United States Could End the War in Yemen if
(Sept.
30,
2018),
it
Wanted
to,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iranyemen-saudi-arabia/571465/ [https://perma.cc/R8JM-FBCC].

52.

Jacob Pramuk, House Votes to End U.S. Support for Yemen Conflict,
Setting up Trump’s Second Veto, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/04/house-passes-yemen-war-powersresolution-setting-up-trump-veto.html [https://perma.cc/69EY-E6R8].
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bipartisan, and it was 54 to 46 in the Senate,53 a little bit closer more
Republicans hung together, but still some departed. Now President
Trump just vetoed that legislation. 54 Let’s go to Milena. Is there
anything that Congress can do at this point to prevent continued
provision of arms to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen?
Milena Sterio: So, while Congress can for the listeners who might
not be familiar with this, Congress can actually override the president
with a two-thirds vote 55 So first I ...
Michael Scharf: They don’t seem to have the votes for that. 56
Milena Sterio: Well, so right so they don’t. 57 But they could right
so if we had a two-thirds vote thatcould override the presidential veto.
The other thing would be to try to draft a different bill that’s a little
bit different, that might get you more support. And I think the trick
might be to actually come up with provisions that are very specific that
would prohibit all sorts of support for the Saudi-led coalition, not just
arm sales, but all sorts of logistical support because there are things
that are not covered by this bill that even if this bill had been voted
our government, our executive branch, could still say well, you didn’t
prohibit us from providing logistic support. You only prohibited us from
selling arms. So, there are more, you know, different kinds of bills that
can be drafted.
Michael Scharf: What is the general authority that gives the
president the right to give four billion dollars in arms to the Saudis?
That that has to come from legislation, right?
53.
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Milena Sterio: Well, so, there is the authorization for the use of
military force that have been passed in the wake of 9/11 which
President Obama, and then the Trump administration, had used very
broadly had relied on very broadly to say basically so long as there is
al Qaeda or any other associated forces anywhere in the world we can
still rely on this 2002 authorization for the use of force to do things.58
Right. There’s also the president’s inherent constitutional authorities
or commander-in-chief that the executive branch can rely on so unless
our Congress passes laws that specifically limit the president from doing
things, the president can say but I’m the commander-in-chief and I can
do this. 59
Michael Scharf: I was thinking, there’s also military spending
bills that give the president’s the ability to buy arms and to provide
them where he wants. Why can’t we, the next time the military
spending bill is up, why couldn’t Congress you know put a tweak in
that and say none of it can be used for Saudi Arabia, and then if the
president did a veto it wouldn’t just be a single bill he’d have to veto
all of his spending around the world.
Milena Sterio: Sure, I mean that is absolutely a possibility, but I
would say that when these especially large bills are passed that have to
do with military spending, often they’re not single item bills. They’re
bills that have lots of different items within them that could be
somewhat fungible and so the executive branch has some discretion as
to how money is spent. But definitely Congress has the power of the
person and can limit spending. 60
Michael Scharf: All right, and I guess everybody here is
convinced that the provision of assistance to Saudi Arabia and the
continued bombing is not going to solve this. That’s what you’ve all
said. Does anybody have a different view on that?
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Paul Williams: I would, this is Paul. I would just add to that.
What’s shocking is it’s clear that the Saudis and the UE don’t actually
have a plan for winning the war or quite frankly winning the peace.
Michael Scharf: Just bombing, bombing, bombing.
Paul Williams: Yep, and so we’re providing refueling, we’re
providing intelligence, we’re providing these weapons as part of the
Saudi initiative to fight the Houthis. But it’s without a plan. And that’s
what’s shocking, in addition to the possibility of being complicit in the
various atrocities and other things, there’s no one end in sight to this
conflict. Because they don’t simply have a roadmap for how they’re
going to win this war.
Michael Scharf: Alright. Well Paul, you as your job, and for 22
years you’ve been building these road maps. Let’s start out with the
question of how can the mallesh, the militias, be convinced to give up
their arms?
Paul Williams: This is all about power sharing. There are so
many factions in so many dimensions to the conflict. You’re going to
need some type of highly decentralized state structure for Yemen. 61 It’s
been a unitary state for decades. 62 There’s all kinds of local grievances.
The need for local wealth sharing, it has a tremendous amount of oil
resources, but it has never been distributed fairly and equitably. It’s
highly difficult to go from unitary state and a post-conflict state into a
democratic or semi Democratic decentralized state. 63 But that’s where
the path to peace path to peace lies that’s the solution.
Michael Scharf: Based on past precedents, what would you say
is a concrete example of what you’re talking about?
Paul Williams: So, you’d want to look at Bosnia as a situation.
It’s highly complex governing structure and it isn’t a flourishing
democratic or economic state, but it has kept the lid on the conflict
and it’s allowed for a degree of normalization in Bosnian in the
surrounding states and the Balkans, many of whom are now European
Union member states, are on that path. And it was a way in which
everyone got a piece of the pie, and that’s how you’re gonna bring this
conflict to an end. To initially give everyone a piece of the pie and then
61.
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to work to develop an identity as Yemenis. The Yemen population has
not had a coherent national identity for many decades. 64 It’s been about
the political elite trying to squeeze as much as they can out of the
country, and basically you know ignoring the 24 million Yemenis.
Michael Scharf: And Milena, Yemen has been described as one
of the poorest countries in the entire planet. 65 How should the
international community approach its reconstruction as part of the
peace process?
Milena Sterio: Sure. So just following up on what Paul said, that
Yemen is actually not a resource poor country. There’s oil. 66 There are
other natural resources there. 67 So I think the trick to having peace and
sustainable peace is making sure that there is actually a basic minimum
standard of living for the Yemeni people which would have to involve
making sure that those natural resources are used in a productive way
and that they actually reach the local population. So, I think the peace
sharing plan would have to involve an economic component, where
there’s actually, you know, a structural reform. Where there’s actually
a plan for how the economy is going to develop going forward.
Michael Scharf: And what role will the United Nations Security
Council play in all of this?
Milena Sterio: Well, I mean so the Security Council is supposed
to act when there is a threat to international peace and security. 68 So I
think getting into economic reform, you get into this issue of is the
Security Council acting outside of its mandate. But I would argue that
it--so long as that economic restructuring is part of peacebuilding--the
Security Council can actually act.
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Michael Scharf: And I was actually asking the question in the
broader context. What can the Security Council do at all to start to
implement the kind of roadmap toward peace that Paul was describing?
Paul Williams: Well one of the very practical things that the
Security Council can do is to undo an earlier resolution. When the
conflict first started the Security Council members . . . which actually,
this is one of the only conflicts where the permanent five work in a very
collaborative fashion. You don’t have these traditional divides that you
see in Libya or in Syria or in Burma, and they thought that there would
be a quick end to this conflict. 69 In part because the French, the British,
the Americans were on the side of the Saudis. 70 And they passed a
resolution which was essentially the Saudi roadmap to peace which is
Houthis give up, go back to your two or three provinces, and let’s go
back to the old way that we were doing business in Yemen. 71 That is a
chapter seven Security Council resolution on the table that constrains
what the negotiator can do and quite frankly what the parties at the
table can do. 72 The Security Council hardly unwinds, or seldom
unwinds, its resolutions, but the very first thing it can do is say there’s
been a fundamental change in circumstances, and in order to promote
peace we have to reconsider the options for what the framework for the
peace plan might look like.
Michael Scharf: And politically you know the Security Council is
really influenced by the five permanent members: the United States,
Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France. 73 Which of those members
would be interested in unwinding the former Security Council
resolutions and setting this new path that you’ve described?
Paul Williams: Ironically, this would be a place where you would
need the Russians or the Chinese to take the lead. Both of them have
been heavily involved and, at the time when I was engaged in the peace
process, were surprisingly constructive. The British, the French, the
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Americans, until they’ve reversed this process of being all in with the
Saudis, I don’t think are gonna take that initiative.
Michael Scharf: And this cozy relationship between the United
States, France, the UK, and Saudi Arabia, is it all oil?
Paul Williams: Its oil and its opposition to Iran.
Michael Scharf: Okay.
Paul Williams: Saudi Arabia’s the cornerstone of our policy. It
would be easy for the Iranians and we’re continuing to go all in on that.
Michael Scharf: So, I’d like to end this segment with a discussion
of the tension between accountability and peace. Jim Johnson, from
your experience as a prosecutor at the special court for Sierra Leone,
do you think the imposition of accountability on those responsible for
atrocity crimes in Yemen would hinder the chances for achieving the
peace that Paul and Milena have been describing?
Jim Johnson: Well Michael, in my view, in the terms to bringing
a long-term peace and a long-term solution justice, and accountability
are very much a part of that process. There’s always this tension after
conflicts of this nature. Particularly where there are war crimes that
have been or are being committed, war crimes and crimes against
humanity, to trade justice for peace, in other words to bring everybody
to the table, we will give amnesties. We will immunize those who have
committed these crimes from any kind of justice or accountability
mechanisms in the first. I think in the long-term solution that’s not
part of the solution. It was Daniel Webster who said ‘justice sir is the
greatest interest of man on earth it is the ligament which holds civilized
beings and civilized nations together’. A component of justice has to be
there. As prosecutors we were one of the few entities that were truly
looking at the victims and bringing some kind of measure of justice to
the victims. Nobody else is doing that. Typically, it’s the victims in
their interest that’s the first casualty of trading justice for peace.
Michael Scharf: All right. So, let’s make this more practical. If
the Houthi rebel Houthi rebel leader is accused of war crimes for
example, how do you negotiate with him a peace treaty were at the end
of the day he’s going to go to jail?
Jim Johnson: That’s very difficult and fortunately I have someone
here and then with Dr. Paul Williams that has tried to do just that
but.
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Michael Scharf: Let’s talk about that Paul. So, you had that
exact challenge when you were representing the Bosnian Muslims at
the Dayton Peace Accords in those negotiations. How did that work
out?
Paul Williams: Well let’s pick this up on Yemen because there’s
interesting facts that I think frames this debate of peace verses justice
as Jim just pointed out. In 2011, there was an initial peace agreement.74
Article 1 of the peace agreement specifically provided for immunity for
President Saleh and those associated with him in the crimes that he
had committed. 75 When the war started again and so they traded, they
wiped away justice for peace with a UN stamp on the top of it. When
the conflict, when the Houthis were looking for an ally, they found
President Saleh and the GPC, and their weapons caches, and their
infrastructure, and it was President Saleh who reemerged with the
Houthis to start this conflict that has plunged Yemen back into chaos.76
So we know what happens in Yemen when you trade justice for peace,
yet don’t actually get justice and you don’t actually get peace.
Michael Scharf: Now tell us about how it worked out in Bosnia?
Paul Williams: Okay so in Bosnia it was crucial because Karadzic
and Mladic, who were the primary antagonists in Bosnia, were indicted
by justice Goldstone of the Yugoslav tribunal in the summer before the
Dayton Accords. 77 And they were excluded from the peace process.
Milosevic was subsequently indicted after the negotiations for his role
in the atrocities in Kosovo and the atrocities in Bosnia. 78 So you were
able to in parallel, negotiate and at the same time build momentum
with justice. So first carried it to Mladic, then the Dayton Peace
Accords, and then Milosevic which was brought in. You can do these
things in parallel same right now Bashir everyone said if you indict the
President of Sudan, Omar Bashir, for genocide crimes against humanity
how are you going to get peace in Sudan. Well he was toppled by his
own people and they’ve had an oar in the process of democratic
74.
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transformation in Sudan 79 and the barrier, the indictment was not a
bar to the people picking up and basically changing their regime. It’s
not a magic wand, but you can certainly have justice woven into the
peace process and without it you’re not gonna get a durable peace.
Michael Scharf: So, Milena, at the risk of a shameless plug you
and I have just published a book with Cambridge University Press
about the legacy of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunal’s. What’s
your take from that experience writing that book, dealing with those
issues, putting it in the big context? What does that tell you about the
big picture of trading justice for peace?
Milena Sterio: Well so I absolutely agree with Paul that pursuing
justice is not a bar to having peace as the experience of the Yugoslavia
and the run the tribunal have shown. And I think to go back to your
question about you know peace and justice; I think that the most
important question to ask is how to sequence the two. Right whether
you pursue both at the same time, whether you pursue justice first and
then pursue peace negotiations. But I think the experience from
Yugoslavia and Rhonda shows that you can have both as long as you
time it properly.
Michael Scharf: Okay well it’s time for another short break.
When we return, we’ll talk about efforts to achieve accountability for
the terrible atrocities in Yemen. Back in a moment.

BREAK
Michael Scharf: This is Michael Scharf and we’re back with
Talking Foreign Policy. I’m joined today by some of the world’s
foremost international law experts, and we’ve been talking about
Yemen, the worst humanitarian crisis on the planet. 80 In this final
segment of our broadcast we’ll be looking at efforts to bring the
perpetrators of some of the worst imaginable crimes seen in years to
justice. Let’s begin with Laura Graham and Jim Johnson. The two of
you have launched the Yemen Accountability Project at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. 81 Laura let’s start with you; can you
tell us about that?
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Laura Graham: Sure, well the Yemen accountability project is a
student-run organization and we document evidence of war crimes, and
we analyze that, and produce white papers and sample indictments.82
And so some of the things that we’ve seen specifically are use of
starvation as a means of war. 83 We’ve seen targeting of civilians and
indiscriminate bombings on civilians as well as targeting of forbidden
sites such as religious sites and hospitals. 84 And so all of this counts as
war crimes. 85
Michael Scharf: And Jim, this was your brainchild. You said one
day let’s create the Yemen Accountability Project. How did this all
unfold?
Jim Johnson: Well I’d like to take full credit for it but we did
have an example of a very similar project initiated by David Crane, a
prosecutor at the special court for Sierra Leone, at Syracuse University
with the Syrian Accountability Project. 86 And they have been working
now for eight years to document crimes in the Syrian conflict, to
identify those crimes, to build a number of different products, and help
facilitate really what this is about is to help facilitate future
prosecutions for those that have committed these crimes in Syria for
the Syrian project and of course in Yemen for our project. 87
Michael Scharf: And I think Paul was mentioning what happens
when you don’t prosecute. It’s sort of that old Hitler quote that
everybody knows you know ‘who after all remembers the fate of the
Armenians’ he said in 1939 as a way of saying let’s go do horrible things
International-Law-Center/News/ArtMID/791/ArticleID/1691
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and nobody will ever prosecute us. 88 And that’s the concern if the people
who’ve committed these war crimes and crimes against humanity in
Yemen are not prosecuted they’ll do what you were describing Paul,
they’ll just launch more war crimes with impunity. And I suppose the
other problem is that there will be revenge killing. If they’re not held
responsible, then people will take justice into their own hands.
Jim Johnson: That’s right. I mean you like to hope that you can
forgive and forget is very much kind of the idea behind trading peace
for justice. But practically that doesn’t happen. They don’t. hey may
forgive initially, but they certainly don’t forget. And if you don’t bring
these perpetrators to justice, as Paul has mentioned, they come back.
Paul Williams: Yeah
Michael Scharf: Well the Yemen Accountability Project reminds
me a little bit of the movie Field of Dreams with Kevin Costner. “If
you build it, he will come” the voice would say. 89 But there’s no real
guarantee that anybody’s going to use the materials that Laura, you
and the students have been producing. Milena, what are the potential
mechanisms for accountability for those alleged to have committed
atrocity crimes in Yemen?
Milena Sterio: Sure, so there are different accountability
mechanisms that you can explore in any conflict and so then we just
briefly mention some of those. One option obviously is to have national
prosecutions. 90 So you could prosecute individuals who commit across
its atrocities in Yemen. In light of the fact that right now there’s a
conflict in Yemen that doesn’t seem likely to happen in the near future.
You could also have a regional court prosecutor. For example, in Africa
the former dictator from Chad, Habré, was prosecuted in a Regional
Court so that’s always an option. 91 You could set up a hybrid tribunal
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which is typically established through the agreement of the host
country in the UN and we saw that in Sierra Leone and in Lebanon.92
You could establish an international ad hoc tribunal. like what we saw
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and for that you typically need
a Security Council resolution. 93 And then we could also talk about the
International Criminal Court as an option, 94 although Yemen is not a
member state of the ICC. 95 So you could really only prosecute so-called
foreign fighters, those who are fighting in Yemen but who are Nationals
of member states of the International Criminal Court. 96
Michael Scharf: And when you mentioned the national courts, I
think you were focusing on Yemen, but couldn’t they also be prosecuted
in far off places like in Europe? Isn’t that what’s happening to the
Syrians today?
Milena Sterio: Absolutely. So, with regard to Syrian nationals
there are actually now prosecutions in Sweden and Germany. 97 I think
most of them are actually in Germany where individuals are being
prosecuted for atrocities that they committed in Syria. There are
countries that have the so-called universal jurisdiction statutes. 98 And
then there are countries that are prosecuting individuals who are dual
national. 99 So you might have someone who’s a dual German and Syrian
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national and now they’re being prosecuted in Germany. So yes, there
could be national prosecutions elsewhere.
Michael Scharf: And you wanted to chime in Paul.
Paul Williams: Yeah Mike. I just want to jump in here that it’s
important to keep this in perspective. In every conflict that I’ve been
engaged in, we have this question of well where’s the mechanism are
we really going to have justice. Okay you’ve convinced me we can’t
have peace without justice but what’s the mechanism. And you
remember when you and I were at the State Department in the office
of legal advisors in the early 90s, we were part of a group that was
saying we ought to have accountability in Yugoslavia. We were scoffed
at. And then we helped partake in sort of building that tribunal which
eventually indicted over 161 individuals including the first head of
state. 100 And then there was the Sierra Leone tribunal, and the Rwanda
tribunal, the Cambodia tribunal, and the Special Tribunal for Lemon
the International Lebanon, the International from Criminal Court. You
don’t always see justice right in front of you at any moment of a
conflict, but it is such a different universe than when we grew up as
young lawyers. There is this desire for accountability. People don’t
forgive and forget and there are plenty of mechanisms that are
continuing it’s a very entrepreneurial field. I’m surprised. They’re
always finding ways to hold people accountable for their atrocities, and
that’s what’s so you know engaging on this.
Michael Scharf: And one of the interesting dynamics is at the
Security Council and the UN where the Security Council members have
been vetoing efforts to have accountability mechanisms, for example for
Syria or for Burma 101 and yet the UN General Assembly created a
mechanism for the investigation for ultimate prosecutions of the
perpetrators in Syria. 102 And the UN Human Rights Commission has

100. The Fugitives, U.N. INT’L. CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the-prosecutor/the-fugitives
[https://perma.cc/M9T7-AZ8H].
101. Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime, THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
4,
2011),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-vetosyria-resolution [https://perma.cc/P4DR-D4LV].
102. Press Release, General Assembly, Head of International Mechanism on
Syria Describes Progress Documenting Crimes Committed by Both Sides,
as General Assembly Takes Up Report, U.N. Press Release GA/12139
(Apr. 23, 2019).

535

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Talking Foreign Policy: Untangling the Yemen Crisis

done the same thing recently for Burma. 103 Has there been any efforts
or talk about doing something like that for Yemen?
Paul Williams: Yeah, the genie of justice is clearly out of the
bottle. And I think that’s what we’re learning is even if the Security
Council is not cooperating and is trying to stifle efforts, justice will find
a way of making its voice heard. And you’re seeing that you’re seeing
that in Yemen. There’s the accountability project that is being run out
of Case Western. There’s talk about now that you’ve got a triple I for
Syria 104 and a double I for Burma. 105 There’s you know talk about doing
something similar for Yemen. 106
Michael Scharf: So that I just want to cover for our listeners who
don’t know...
Paul Williams: I can never all three “I’s”.
Michael Scharf: I think
investigatory mechanism, right?

its

international

independent

Milena Sterio: In part
Michael Scharf: Yeah. All right. So, Laura, Paul just sort of
handed it to you by saying that you guys are starting this process out.
Tell us about the kinds of products that your Yemen Accountability
Project are creating.
Laura Graham: Well as I said before we do investigations and
analysis. One of the products is we are developing a crime base matrix
and so what this is a document where we contain various crimes that
we’ve investigated and have analyzed. 107 And we situate them under
103. Press Release, Security Council, Head of Human Rights Fact-Finding
Mission on Myanmar Urges Security Council to Ensure Accountability for
Serious Violations against Rohingya, U.N. Press Release SC/13552 (Oct.
24, 2018).
IMPARTIAL
INDEP.
MECHANISM,
104. Mandate,
INT’L,
https://iiim.un.org/mandate/ [https://perma.cc/7TZ4-NUEL].
105. See GLOBAL JUST. CTR., FACT SHEET: STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN BURMA (Oct. 2018),
http://globaljusticecenter.net/files/Structural-Barriers---Burma.pdf.
106. Urgent Need for Independent International Inquiry on Yemen, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/29/urgentneed-independent-international-inquiry-yemen#
[https://perma.cc/5W5J-BVRN].
107. Case Western YAP, supra note 81.
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the statutes or treaties where those crimes can be prosecuted. 108 So we
have the relevant articles of the Geneva Conventions, we have the
relevant articles of the ICC. 109 And then we also will in time be putting
together representational indictments as well as white papers. 110 We’re
currently working on a white paper at the moment that is looking at
aiding and abetting
Michael Scharf: And again, because we’re using a lot of
expressions here that are jargon-y aren’t all papers white I mean the
white paper. What is the significance of a white paper?
Laura Graham: A white paper is just a policy paper and it’s
something that policymakers can use to inform their decisions. 111
Michael Scharf: And Jim why these particular products?
Jim Johnson: These products are based directly on our
experiences when we set up the office of the prosecutor for the special
court of Sierra Leone. and looking at what we needed or what we wished
we would have had when we got to Sierra Leone because you have to
remember when you look at a country like Sierra Leone, when you look
at Yemen, when you look at Syria, and you’re going in there to begin
an investigative process. The whole country is a crime scene. You have
thousands of crime locations. You have tens of thousands of victims,
and you need some place to start. and so, when you look at the conflict
narrative that helps you to track the flow of the contract conflict, to
look at the trends, a crime base matrix, and a major incidents index
helps us to focus our investigations as we go forward. And also helps
you to look at what are the trends, what are possibly the signature
crimes coming out of this conflict. When we went into Yemen. hen we
went into Sierra Leone we could quickly identify that some of the scene
signature crimes were gender violence. 112 The this phenomenon of forced
marriage, and sexual slavery, and the amputation phenomenon, and
inhumane treatment. 113 So these are exactly the products that help you
to begin an investigation. When you’re looking at the whole country is
a crime scene and you’re looking at tens of thousands of victims.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. “We’ll Kill You If You Cry” Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict,
RTS.
WATCH
(Jan.
16,
2003),
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/01/16/well-kill-you-if-you-cry/sexualviolence-sierra-leone-conflict [https://perma.cc/LEC3-EE9E].
113. Id.

537

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Talking Foreign Policy: Untangling the Yemen Crisis

Michael Scharf: So how is your project different from what other
organizations and NGOs that have been advocating for the victims and
Yemen from what they’re doing?
Jim Johnson: Well it’s kind of the whole we’re trying to bring
many things together. One thing you do have to remember is that we’re
taking an impartial look. We’re looking at all sides to the conflict. We’re
not looking at only at crimes being committed by Saudi Arabia or we’re
not looking at only at crimes being committed by the rebel faction in
Yemen. We’re looking across the board. And so, we are very impartial
in that respect. But not only are we collecting the data on incidents
and alleged crimes or alleged atrocities, but we’re also matching that
incident to customary international law. 114 There’s a war crime, a crime
against humanity. What violation of the Geneva Convention is it?
What violation of the International Criminal Courts statute? So, we’re
looking at much broader look. And then of course, as Laura has
mentioned, we’re taking specific, possibly signature crimes or very
important issues and looking at it closely. We’re looking at aiding and
abetting, something that’s probably the U.S. involvement, we should
be, the U.S. should be concerned about this. 115 Are they committing the
crime of aiding and abetting with what they’re providing to the Saudiled coalition?
Michael Scharf: All right well what you’re describing is a huge
undertaking. And I know when you approached me to describe what
you had in mind you said well maybe I’ll get a dozen students to help
out with this. Laura can you tell us how the students have responded
to the call for action?
Laura Graham: We have had an overwhelming response from
students. So, we currently have about 12 that are on the leadership
team that run various parts of the project. And we have 70 students in
the general body that are JD and LLM and SJD students at Case.116
And then we also ...
Michael Scharf: Again, these are all initials, so these are foreign
graduate students.
Laura Graham: Yeah

114. Case Western YAP, supra note 81.
115. Kristine Beckerle, US Officials Risk Complicity in War Crimes in Yemen,
RTS.
WATCH
(May
4,
2017),
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/04/us-officials-risk-complicity-warcrimes-yemen# [https://perma.cc/635E-CUU9].
116. Case Western YAP, supra note 81.
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Michael Scharf: Speak Arabic and can write and actually read
the Arabic language materials and translate it for you?
Laura Graham: Yes, and they and one of them actually did
translate the Yemeni Penal Code for us.
Michael Scharf: Wow okay. So, Jim you told us that the
precedent for this was the Syria Accountability Project, but you’re a
big thinker. And you’ve put this into an even larger context. What is
the larger initiative that you’re involved in and how does this fit into
that puzzle?
Jim Johnson: We’ve created an NGO called the Global
Accountability Initiative. And this is really an umbrella organization
that we’ve created for the Syrian Accountability Project, the Yemen
Accountability Project, and we’re looking at other schools, other law
schools, that have very much an interest in being involved in these kind
of accountability projects. And of course, this brings something to their
schools. These students are working on something that they can see. I
mean they may not see the product of the results of their products
because they may not see an accountability mechanism for a number
of years. We hope they do eventually see an accountability major
mechanism. But they’re doing something right now that has real-world
implications and may help bring justice to millions of people.
Michael Scharf: And what I’ve noticed as a Dean recruiting, you
know, the new law students is that this cohort is more interested than
any that I can remember in having an impact when they get out of law
school and changing the world, changing society. And what you are
doing, and what Laura is experiencing, is that you don’t have to wait
till you graduate. You’re having an impact right now as a first-year law
student. Now, in addition to documenting the crimes we’ve been talking
a little bit about, some of the legal issues like aiding and abetting. I
understand Laura that you’re looking at some other legal issues and
one of those in the Yemen conflict is whether it is an internal or
international armed conflict and what law should apply. What is your
team concluded about that and why is that important?
Laura Graham: Well there’s certainly evidence that it looks like
an international armed conflict, but then there’s not consensus in the
international community to call it that. 117 And so we are looking at it
as though it is a civil war but we are also analyzing it as an
117. See Natalie McIntosh, GRC’s Submissions to the Human Rights Council
Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen, GLOBAL RTS. COMPLIANCE (May
6,
2018),
https://www.globalrightscompliance.com/en/news/grcssubmissions-to-the-human-rights-council-group-of-eminent-experts-onyemen [https://perma.cc/FAT7-FQSA].
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international armed conflict. And so, the implications of that is that we
have to look at both the first and second additional protocols to the
Geneva Conventions and how we assess these crimes. So for example,
mass starvation under article 54 of the first Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions, has very strict prohibitions against the use of
starvation as a weapon of war. 118 But under the second Additional
Protocol, which pertains to civil conflicts, it doesn’t have those same
stringent prohibitions. 119 And so the way that we analyze the evidence
and the sample indictments that we will produce may have different
levels of accountability attached to them.
Michael Scharf: And then what are the next steps for the Yemen
accountability project Jim?
Jim Johnson: Well of course we have some catching up to do
because the Yemeni conflict as we know dates clear back to 2011 but
it got pretty hot in 2015. 120 And so we of course want to be documenting
what’s going on right now but we have some catching up to do. And as
we build our crime base marriage narratives and matrixes we will
eventually be making these available to United Nations organizations,
to interested governments, to other NGOs that are that have a similar
interest, so that we can get our information out there. 121 Possibly just
one example, the Syrian accountability project has been going on now
for eight years, and they have amassed nearly 30,000 pages of evidence
concerning crimes that took place in Syria during that conflict. And so
that’s the direction we’re going. 122
Michael Scharf: And everything you’re looking at is public source
material. So, I’m talking about like newspaper articles and public
accounts on the Internet, right?
Jim Johnson: That’s correct. That’s correct.
Michael Scharf: So, let me ask Paul, your NGO the Public
International Law and Policy Group, you just concluded a major
118. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict art.
54, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
119. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609.
120. BBC, Yemen Crisis, supra note 69.
121. Case Western YAP, supra note 81.
122. Id.
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empirical study of the crimes committed by Burma against the
Rohingya people. 123 And you did this with funding by the State
Department. You sent a team in that interviewed 1100 Rohingya
refugees, and you got actual evidence not just newspaper accounts but
first-hand documentary evidence of testimonials. 124 And what did you
conclude based on that?
Paul Williams: We pulled together a team of a dozen and a half
former investigators from these tribunals around the globe and actually
went and spent two months in the camp doing an investigation in the
same way that you would do if you were investigating for war crimes
for these tribunals. 125 And what we found was frankly genocide.126 We
had the investigators who work for these tribunals and then their work
was reviewed by former US government and British government and
other government officials and said look apply the standard as if you
were still in the government. Because we don’t to be an NGO going
around and say well genocide. But we looked at it and it was clear that
the government of Burma and the armed forces were committing
genocide against the Rohingya population. 127 And what was stunning is
our investigators who worked on the genocide in Bosnia, worked on the
Srebrenica Massacre, worked on a number of these other cases, had said
this was by far and away the most planned, most brutal, most
systematic approach to basically moving a million people out of the
country by killing them.
Michael Scharf: And you didn’t get that from public sources you
had to go on the scene to do those interviews. So, is something like that
likely and we only have a minute or less, but do you think something
like that could work for Yemen?
Paul Williams: It’s possible because these conflicts generate high
levels of refugees. And the refugees are accessible when they’re outside
of the country and they’re willing to tell their story.
Michael Scharf: Well we’re just about out of time. This has been
incredible, especially because it’s the story not just of a crisis gone awry,
but of a local educational institution and what students can do to make
a difference and the place that they can play in changing the world.
123. See Documenting Atrocity Crimes Committed Against the Rohingya in
Myanmar’s
Rakhine
State,
PILPG,
https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/rohingya-report
[https://perma.cc/L95E-N72P].
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Well Paul Williams, Milena Stereo, Jim Johnson, and Laura Graham,
thank you so much for providing your insights on the crisis in Yemen.
You gave us all a lot to think about. I’m Michael Scharf. You’ve been
listening to talking foreign policy.
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